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A Shifting Balance: Freedom of
Expression and Hate-Speech Restriction
Jean Stefancic* &
Richard Delgado**
INTRODUCTION

This timely book appears just as the controversy over hate speech is
reaching crescendo proportions. In the United States, scholars, journalists,
civil rights activists, and constitutional law experts are sharply divided over
the wisdom and legality of campus conduct codes that regulate hateful
speech. 1 States and cities are experimenting with statutes and ordinances
penalizing hate-motivated behavior.2 Recently, the Canadian Supreme
Court upheld statutes penalizing pornography3 and certain types of hate
speech. 4 The United States Supreme Court took a different direction. In
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,5 the Court declared unconstitutional a disorderly
conduct ordinance under which the defendant had been convicted of crossburning.
Striking A Balance is a groundbreaking collection of papers delivered at
the first major international conference on hate speech and freedom of
expression. 6 Published in London by ARTICLE 19, International Centre
Against Censorship, the book features an impressive list of contributors,
among them major figures in the international human rights community,
delegates from European and Third World nations, and legal scholars from
*Research Associate, University of Colorado School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons College, 1963;
M.A. University of San Francisco, 1989.
**Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., University of
California at Berkeley, 1974.
1. CompareNadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?,
1990 Duke L.J. 484 (opposing regulation); Chester Finn, The Campus: An Island of
Repression in a Sea of Freedom, Commentary, Sept. 1989, at 18 (opposing regulation);
George Will, Liberal Censorship, Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 1989, at C7 (opposing regulation) with
Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 343 (1991) (supporting regulation); Charles- Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431 (supporting regulation); Man
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev.
2320 (1989) (supporting regulation).
2. E.g., Laura Shapiro, When Is a Joke Not a Joke? Shouts and Swastikas are Getting the
Last Laugh, Newsweek, May 23, 1988, at 79. For discussion of efforts to regulate hard-core
pornography, see Andrea Dworkin & Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography and Civil Rights:
A New Day for Women's Equality (1988). Readers interested in up-to-date information and
statistics on hate crimes may communicate with the Nat'l Inst. Against Prejudice & Violence,
located in Baltimore, MD.
3. Regina v. Butler, 89 D.L.R. 4th 449 (1992) (Can.).
4. Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
5. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
6. Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination
(Sandra Coliver ed., 1992) [hereinafter Striking a Balance].
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the United States and other countries. All are struggling with the challenge
encompassed in balancing liberty and community; freedom of expression
and freedom from discrimination; and the marketplace of ideas and the
7
right of minority groups to self-respect.
This essay reviews these efforts with two hopes in mind. First, the
experiences of these other nations might shed light on disputed factual
premises that figure prominently in our own national debate. For example,
opponents of regulation often argue that suppressing racism will cause it to
go underground, only to emerge in even more virulent forms later.8 For
their part, proponents of regulation assert that without legal rules and
prohibitions, bigotry and intolerance will simply increase. 9 The experiences
of the various other countries documented in Striking A Balance enable us to
begin analyzing such assertions.
Second, this collection of documents can clarify a theoretical insight
that some scholars have put forward. They point out that hate speech is
most pernicious when concerted and deployed by a powerful majority
against a relatively weak minority.' 0 This suggests that homogeneous
nations with a strong sense of community may not need strictly drawn rules
regulating what may or may not be said." These cultures may more easily
tolerate scathing speech because there is less likelihood that it will contribute to serious repression. The essays, international standards, country
experiences, and policy statements from human rights organizations presented in Striking A Balance enable us to evaluate this hypothesis.
Part I of this essay gives a brief description'of the organization and
contents of the book, focusing particularly on ways in which the international community has attempted to balance liberty and equality. Part II
explores lessons the United States can learn,from those experiences, paying
special attention to their impact on disputed factual premises similar to the
ones mentioned above. Part III addresses the communitarian insight. Do
the accounts in Striking A Balance bear out the supposition that the more
tightly integrated a community, the more tolerant its citizenry, the less the
need for hate-speech controls? Can nations that are sharply divided into
dissenting factions of race, ethnicity, or religion tolerate scathing speech, or
is some form of regulation an essential aspect of maintaining community?

7. See id. at 413-17. For notes ofi the sponsoring organization, see id. at iv, viii-ix.
8. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
10. E.g., Delgado, supra note 1, at 383-84.
11. See infra Part III for further discussion of this hypothesis. On recent assessments of the
United States's progress in this area, see, e.g., Andrew Hacker, Two Nations (1992) (arguing
that some progress has been made, yet many barriers remain); Leon Higginbotham, In the
Matter of Color (1978) (same); Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for
Racial Justice (1987) (arguing that much work remains to be done). On the recent factionalization of Europe, see Thom Shanker, New Iron Curtain of Hate Enshrouds Eastern Europe,
San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 20, 1992, at B6.

HATE SPEECHREGULATION

I
The book begins with two overviews of the international situation, one
by Kevin Boyle, Professor of Law and Director of the Human Rights
Centre, University of Essex, 12 the other by Paul Gordon, Senior Research
Officer, Runnymede Trust.13 Boyle's essay succinctly poses the issue with
which the remainder of the book is concerned: namely, how recent
outbreaks of racial, ethnic, and religious hostilities require society to
reconsider the relationship between freedom of expression and freedom
from verbal harassment for minority groups.' 4 He notes that the United
States stands virtually alone in extending freedom of expression to what has
come to be called hate speech. 15 Most countries tolerate some degree of
regulation. But First Amendmentjurisprudence and our unique "history as
a society born in rebellion against . . . censorship" militate against
regulation of any but the most pernicious forms of speech in the United
States.1 6 Boyle reminds us that "[t]here is a communal as well as an
individual dimension to human rights and freedoms," and that "[T]he
individual's right to promote racist views must ... be defended [not only]
in terms of individual rights, but in terms of the communal interests in
equality."1 7 He implies that a sensible society would limit speech when it
begins to endanger these latter interests.' 8
A second essay, by Paul Gordon, focuses on European racism and
xenophobia.' 9 Gordon describes the nature and extent of racist violence,
identifies the affected parties, and relates these conflicts to the larger
political context of emerging nationalism and the end of the Soviet empire.
A final group of essays discusses international treaties and declarations
concerning freedom from discrimination and freedom of expression, such
as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).20 Commentaries by noted human rights advocates, including Karl
Josef Partsch, Danilo Turk, and Louis Joinet, examine the history of these
documents and their current interpretations. 2' Pertinent excerpts from
some of them appear in Annexe A. Declarations and reservations to CERD
and ICCPR by various countries appear in Annexe B.
Although the preceding part will undoubtedly prove of great use to
scholars wishing to acquaint themselves with the international dimension of
12. Kevin Boyle, Overview of a Dilemma, in Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 1-8.
13. Paul Gordon, Racist Violence: the Expression of Hatred in Europe, in Striking a
Balance, supra note 6, 9-17.
14. See also Shanker, supra note 11, at B6.
15. Boyle, supra note 12, at 4-6.
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Id. at 5-8; see also Sharyn Ch'ang, Legislating Against Racism, in Striking a Balance,
supra note 6, at 87, 100 (discussing Australia's similar perspective).
19. Gordon, supra note 13, at 9-17.
20. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 21-71.
21. Id. at 21-28 (Partsch), 35-54 (Turk &Joinet).
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hate-speech law, the next part, an imposing 240-page compilation of
Country Experiences, is likely to prove of greater benefit to scholars
studying the problem in the United States. 22 In this section, twenty-five
legal scholars and human rights activists present the experiences of fifteen
countries in coping with racial, ethnic, and religious violence, and the legal
framework each has put into place to deal with the problem. The countries
include: Argentina, Australia, Canada, the Commonwealth of Independent
States (formerly the Soviet Union), Denmark, France, Germany, India,
Israel, the Netherlands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Uruguay.
Following the country reports, policy statements appear from eleven
national human rights organizations, such as the ACLU (U.S.) and ARTICLE 19 (UK), and from ethnic and religious defense organizations such as
the American-Arab Relations Committee and the Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith.23
A short concluding part contains essays evaluating laws against insult
and incitement, including a summary by the book's editor, Sandra Coliver,
an American lawyer who serves as legal officer to ARTICLE 19 in
London. 24 Michael Banton, Professor of Sociology, University of Bristol,
United Kingdom, discusses the interrelation of racially-insulting speech
and patterns of social interaction. Professor Banton concludes that laws
against racism may create norms and shape behavior. 25 The book ends with
various annexes, a selected bibliography, and notes on contributors.
II
The debate in the United States on hate speech and hate crimes is
heated and still unresolved. 26 The recent R.A.V. decision signaled, in no
uncertain terms, that regulations of insulting or terror-provoking symbols
and expression must be carefully constructed and drafted. 27 Courts will

examine searchingly any empirical premises that underlie these regulations. Similarly, equality concerns which lie at the heart of the controversy
require that those arguing against restraints on hate speech justify their
own premises and claims. 28 Both sides of the debate make a number of
assertions with great confidence, yet without much reference to empirical
data. 29 The experiences of other nations can illuminate the truth or falsity
22. Id. at 75-312.
23. Id. at 315-46.
24. Sandra Coliver, Hate Speech Laws: Do They Work, in Striking A Balance, supra note
6, at 363-74. Ms. Coliver, a U.S.-born lawyer, received her law degree from U.C.-Berkeley and
has taught law in a number of schools in the San Francisco area. Id. at 413 (Notes on

Contributors).
25. Id. at 349-57.
26. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
27. In R.A.V., the Court held the St. Paul ordinance irredeemably content-based and not
adequately narrowly tailored to promote the compelling state interest of protecting basic
human rights. R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2544-45, 2547-50 (1992).

28. See Delgado, supra note 1, at 34548, 381-83; Boyle, supra note 12, at 1-8.
29. See Delgado, supra note 1, at 358-61, 364-71 (discussing these assertions).

HATE SPEECHREGULATION

of particular empirical assertions.
A.

ASSERTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ANTI-REGULATION POSITION

Suppressing racist speech will cause it to go undergroundonly to
30
surface in more virulentforms later.
The experiences detailed in the book do not sustain this "hydraulic"
view of racism frequently put forward by opponents of regulation in the
United States. 3 ' Most countries find that all but a small group of extremists
accept some regulation, agreeing that such regulation is a step toward
restoring and maintaining racial harmony. The sole exceptions are two
32
countries with long histories of racial or ethnic oppression, South Africa
3
3
and Sri Lanka, where censoring hate speech does seem to increase the
incidence of ethnic hatred.
1.

2. Hate speech is not the root of the problem; regulatingit is a
34
diversion.
Some opponents of United States regulation of hate speech urge that
laws against racial insults divert attention from what should be the main
goal-getting at the core of discrimination itself.3 5 They maintain that

better means, such as education, counseling, teaching, voluntary restraint,
and civil rights litigation, are available.36 Focusing on hate-speech regulation can deflect us from other more important tasks.3 7 Though most
countries appear to agree that these other measures are necessary and
useful, only two (Israel and South Africa) argue that "efforts to fight racism
should be concentrated on racist and discriminatory actions"3 8 and not hate
speech itself. Most nations appear to find that regulating hate speech is a
useful adjunct to other measures for maintaining intergroup harmony. The
experiences of most of the nations covered in the book appear not to
support a "diversion" charge.

30. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 308-09, 322.
31. E.g., Nadine Strossen, Address to judicial Conference, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
(July 1992); Delgado, supra note 1, at 372 (discussing this view); see also Striking the Balance,
supra note 6, at viii-Frances D'Souza, Director, ARTICLE 19 puts forth this view (ARTICLE
19 is a London-based international organization dedicated to preserving freedom of expression. Id. at iv, viii-ix).
32. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 222, 235-36, 237.
33. Id. at 242.
34. Id. at 305, 312, 322.
35. See Delgado, supi-a note 1, at 361.
36. See supra note 17 and sources cited therein.
37. Id.
38. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 195, 235.

78

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[1993]

3.

Societies inevitably turn rules against race hatred against minorities
or political dissidents39
The experience of more progressive countries like Canada does not
bear out the claim that regulation backfires-harming those it is designed
to protect.40 In more repressive societies, however, such as South Africa
and the former Soviet Union, ruling majorities have deployed laws against
hate speech to stifle minority-group members and blacks who spoke out
against oppression. 41 Under apartheid, virtually all reported prosecutions
were of those on the left wing of the political spectrum; black victims of
racial abuse by whites rarely found protection in these laws. 42 Israel 43 and

Sri Lanka44 report similar experiences. Whether the United States experience would follow suit remains an open question.
4.

Hate-speech regulation will lead to further erosion offreedom of
45
speech.
Many in the United States who take the position that hate-speech laws
are unwise argue that such measures inevitably lead down the "slippery
slope" to greater regulation of speech. 4 6 Although some of the essayists
mentioned this concern, no country report did. Indeed, the experiences of
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands-countries
whose commitment to freedom of inquiry arguably is comparable to that of
the United States-imply that limited regulation of hate speech does not
invariably cause deterioration of the respect accorded free speech.4 7
Citizens seem to regard anti-hate-speech laws as limited exceptions comparable to libel or official-secret rules necessary to preserve a decent society.
48
5. Talking back is better.
Some opponents of hate-speech regulation argue that laws are substitutes for a much preferable response to hate speech, namely, encouraging
victims to speak out and denounce the practice.4 9 This argument appears
not to be in broad currency as no country report addressed this assertion.
In the meantime, recent reports of minority-group members who were
attacked and seriously injured as a result of talking back to their harassers
cast doubt on the wisdom of this counsel.

39. Id. at 259, 307.
40. Id. at 109.
41. Id. at 138, 221.
42. Id. at 223.
43. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 194.
44. Id. at 240.
45. Id. at 304.
46. E.g., Strossen, supra note 31; Delgado, supra note 1, at 371 (discussing the "snowball

effect").
47. See Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 106-29, 140-70, 201-07.
48. Id. at 309-10, 322.
49. Strossen, supra note 31; see Jon Wiener, Racial Hatred on Campus, The Nation, Feb.
27, 1989, at 260, 262 (advocating that university leaders also speak out).

HATE SPEECHREGULATION

6. Laws against hate speech will chill discussion, especially in sensitive
settings like university campuses.50
This argument, analogous in structure to the "slippery slope" argument discussed earlier, receives similar treatment in the country reports.
France 5' and Germany52 argue that academic freedom is not absolute and
therefore must be weighed against such countervailing values as the human
dignity of students. In the new South Africa, however, "race issues and
Regulation of... speech and publications
politics substantially overlap ....
chill political debate within that
[unacceptably]
would, therefore,
country."5 Like other slippery-slope concerns, the likelihood that these
laws will chill vital expression depends on how societies view hate speech. If
it is perceived as abhorrent and far removed from speech's core functions,
most will believe they may regulate it without chilling other speech.
7. Criminal prosecution of hate speech is not effective; other means
4
should be triedfirst.

Many opponents of hate-speech regulation in the United States cite
the fear that criminal prosecution is too rigid. Moreover, they suspect that
it will prove ineffective because judges and others will shy away from
interpreting the laws as legislators designed them to be interpreted.5 5 Nine
countries addressed this concern, most agreeing with the proposition cited.
Australia found that there was a. generalized reluctance to convict. 56 In
Canada there were few prosecutions for a long time. Recently, however,
more have occurred, coinciding with an increase in racial unrest in that
country. 57 In the recent case of Regina v. Keegstra,58 the Canadian Supreme
Court upheld a section of the national criminal code that penalized various
forms of hate speech in the case of a teacher who described Jews in
disparaging terms to his pupils and declared that the Holocaust did not
happen. In Russia, prosecutors have not enforced laws against nonviolent
acts provoking ethnic hatred; hostile speech is virtually never prosecuted. 59
In Denmark, 60 Germany, 6 ' the Netherlands, 62 England,63 Northern
50. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 304.
51. Id. at 155.
52. Id. at 168.
53. Id. at 234; but see Gilbert Marcus, Racial Hostility: The South African Experience, in
Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 208-22 (pointing out that in the old regime, hate-speech
laws were used actively, but always against blacks).
54. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 307, 321-22.
55. Strossen, supra note 31 (arguing that such laws are likely to backfire).
56. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 99, 104.
57. Id. at 121.
58. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
59. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 133.
60. Id. at 141.
61. Id. at 164.
62. Id. at 206.
63. Id. at 248, 257, 259.
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Ireland, 64 and generally throughout Europe, prosecutions are infrequent.
In sum, most countries do appear to eschew harsh criminal sanctions as the
main line of defense against hate speech and the milder forms of hate
crime. Restrictions are more likely to be enforced if civil in nature, or, if
criminal, only if they contain mild penalties. The recent decision in R.A.V.
bears out this generalization. The municipal ordinance provided relatively
severe penalties for bias-motivated disorderly conduct as mild as writing
graffiti.6 5 The United States Supreme Court recently declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
66
8. Prosecutionmakes hatemongers into martyrs.
Other opponents of hate-speech regulation argue that punishing
utterers of racial insult and invective simply focuses attention on hatemongers and enables them to paint themselves as martyrs,67 making matters
worse. If acquitted, they claim vindication; if convicted, they portray
themselves as hounded and harassed victims of intolerance. The country
reports contained in this volume provide some support for this assertion. In
two countries, Canada 68 and the United Kingdom, 69 prosecution of hate
groups produced this effect. Yet, other countries did not report such
experiences. Moreover, Great Britain and Canada did not see fit to
discontinue their approach to regulation because of the occasional racist
martyr it produced. The country experiences, therefore, offer only minor
support for this supposition.

B.
1.

ASSERTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRO-REGULATION POSITION

Racism is increasingthroughout the world and needs to be addressed
70

through law.

Most United States proponents of regulation, and even some detractors, believe that hate speech and hate crimes are increasing. In particular,
many believe that the last few years have witnessed a strong upsurge.7 1
Reports from nine other countries verify that this is so. Indeed, since 1990,
racial and religious incitement appears to have increased around the world,
most markedly in democratic societies.
64. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 249.

65. The punishment could include five years in prison. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.

Ct. 2538, 2541 n.1 (1992).
66. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 308, 322.
67. Strossen, supra note 31; Michael Greve, Address at Michigan State University Dep't of
Political Science (Oct. 1992).
68. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 122.
69. Id. at 259.
70. Id. at 284.
71. See supra note I and sources cited therein; Ronna Schneider, Hate Speech in the
United States, in Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 269; Gordon, supra note 13, at 9-17

(arguing that racism is increasing rapidly in Europe; the increase may even be under-reported
by a factor of nine or ten).

HATE SPEECHREGULATION

In Canada, a recent unprecedented rise of anti-Semitism, Holocaust
denial, and revisionism resulted in the historic litigation of a trilogy of
cases.7 2 An escalation of inter-ethnic conflict has emerged in the former
Soviet Union, 73 while a wave of xenophobia and violence against immigrants and refugees has swept over Denmark.7 4 In France, Africans and
Jews are targets for group libel and incitement.7 5 Publications advocating
Holocaust revisionism and outbreaks of violence against aliens, asylum
seekers, Jews, and Gypsies are occurring more frequently in Germany7 6 and
throughout Europe.7 7 India, though remarkably successful in creating a
diverse democratic society, nonetheless has suffered considerable incitement to religious and communal hatred in recent years.78 Jewish-Arab
hostilities in Israel also increased over the past several years. 79 Sri Lankans
-Buddhists, Tamils, and Muslims -have struggled through an ethnic and
religious civil war during the past seven years.8 0 In the United Kingdom, an
estimated 70,000 racist attacks occur per year and hate propaganda is
increasing.8 ' In Europe, one in three citizens believes that there are too
many persons of other races or nationalities living in that citizen's country;
only 19% disapprove completely of racist movements. 82 In Austria, nearly
one-half believe the Jews were partly to blame for their own prosecution.83
The German reporter described the situation in his country as a "frighten' 84
ing revival.
2.

Suppressing hate speech will reduce the underlying impulse: racism.

Though this is a leading position in the psychological literature,8 5 the
country reports offer it little support. Although attaching penalties to any
conduct presumably causes at least some actors to refrain from it, the
worldwide increase in racism and other acts of group-hatred dwarfs, this
effect. No society reported that adoption of anti-hate laws produced a
dramatic reduction in hate crimes and speech, much less in racism itself. It
is possible, of course, that without laws the increase would be even greater.
But the efficacy of hate-speech regulation must remain an open question at
the present.
72. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 123-24.
73. Id. at 130.
74. Id. at 140.
75. Id. at 148.
76. Id. at 159, 165.
77. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 9-17.
78. Id. at 171, 178-79.
79. Id. at 182.
80. Id. at 239.
81. Id. at 257.
82. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 15.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 159.
85. See Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 470-71 (25th Anniversary ed. 1979)
(arguing that laws deter whomever is deterrable).
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3. Hate speech harms its victims.86
The efficacy of racism, however, is not in question. Though some
disagree on the extent of the harm, few disagree that hate speech injures its
victims. The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged this by using a
harm-based rationale to justify criminalizing hate speech in the Keegstra
decision. 87 The French country report recognized that, in addition to
psychological and moral harm, hate speech damages the individual and
collective reputations of its victims.8 8 Germans view a racial or ethnic attack
as an affront to a person's core identity.8 9 Uruguay professes to have one of
the few laws that expressly acknowledges the pain caused by racist words or
acts. 90 The Netherlands recognizes racist statements as insulting and
distressing; 9' South Africans, that the racial insult "harms souls";9392 and in
the United Kingdom, racial vilification is a form of defamation.
94
4. Hate speech harms society.
Canadian, French, and German statutory documents affirm a corollary proposition about the broader effect of hateful speech on the community. The Keegstra decision notes that hate propaganda can harm society as
a whole. 95 In France, the preamble to a longstanding statute on group libel
declares that such "aggression is directed against the whole body politic and
its social and moral fabric." 96 Article 131 of the German Criminal Code
seeks to protect the "social harmony" endangered by incitement to racial
hatred. Common law in the United97Kingdom restricts racist speech in part
to avoid harm to the public order.

5. Regulating hate speech will send a symbolic message to potential
98
offenders.
Although it is difficult to show any immediately discernible deterrent
effects of anti-hate-speech laws, many societies remain convinced that they
serve an important symbolic function. Hate-speech laws place offenders on
notice that racial vilification will earn official disapproval. Hate-speech laws
also strengthen those in the society who promote racial harmony. The
reporter for the Soviet Union writes that laws against hate speech are an
86. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 290-91, 293-94.
87. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
88. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 156.
89. Id. at 160, 163, 169.
90. Id. at 200.
91. Id. at 204.
92. Id. at 209.
93. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 262.
94. Id. at 287, 290.
95. (1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 745-49, 758, 811-12 (Can.).
96. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 156.
97. Id. at 245.
98. Id. at 294.

HATE SPEECH REGULATION
essential tool for curbing ethnic hostilities. 99 Reporters for Israel declare
that its new law "has reinforced anti-racist ideology and influenced modes
10 0
A
of behavior through its normative proscription against racism."
government report from the Netherlands states that the purpose of its
0
hate-speech regulation is to bring about a change in social attitudes.' '
03
02
and Australian1 officials justify the outlawing of hate speech by
British
emphasizing that proscription symbolically expresses official condemnation
of bigotry and ethnic hatred.
Racism unchecked gets worse.
04
Some proponents of hate-speech regulation offer this argument,
which in some respects mirrors the slippery slope argument opponents of
regulation raise. 10 5 The country reports provide evidence that racism is
increasing around the world, 10 6 but it is not clear what role laws against hate
speech play in checking that increase. A few country reports, as well as the
editor's conclusion, 0 7 suggest that a coordinated program of anti-racist
measures, including speaking out, strict enforcement of existing laws
against harm to persons or property, and regulations aimed at the most
virulent forms of hate speech, may do some good. But the validity of even
this supposition is open to question. There seems to be no magical cure for
the current tide of racism.
6.

III
As was mentioned in the Introduction, recent scholarship sheds light
on how expression and interpretation are interwoven with the idea of
community. Robert Post writes that community is "a social formation that
inculcates norms into the very identities of its members."' 0 8 Frank Michelman echoes the same theme when he states:
This view [civic republicanism] of the human condition implies
that self-cognition and... self-legislation must, to a like extent, be
socially situated; norms must be formed through public dialogue
and expressed as public law. Normative reason ... cannot be a
solitary activity. Its exercise requires knowledge, including selfknowledge, obtainable only by encounter with different outlooks
in public argument. Thus its requisite forum is 'a political com-

99. Id. at 135.
100. Id. at 191.

101. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 207.
102. Id. at 254-55.
103. Id. at 104.
104. E.g., Delgado, supra note 1,at 346; Lawrence, supra note 1,at 468-69. See Boyle, supra
note 12, at 4; Gordon, supra note 13, at 15-16.
105. See supra Part IIA-4.
106. See supra Part IIB-1.
107. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 363, 365-66, 374.
108. Robert Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 603, 645 (1990).
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109

If this is so, it seems to follow that a culture that has achieved a
desirable measure of community would resist perceived threats to that
community, including ones from hate speech. Hate speech vilifies and
excludes its victims. When class-based, as it generally is, it threatens to
fracture community by raising levels of resentment and hostility. Moreover,
as minority scholars such as Mari Matsuda 1 0 and Charles Lawrence"I 1 have
pointed out, hate speech, when concerted and extended over time, may
create enduring castes that will prove highly resistant to change. 1 2
A reasonable hypothesis, then, is that a nation which values a
pre-existing harmony and fears an upsurge in racism or other types of
group-hatred, will act reflexively to curb hateful utterances that endanger
its own interpretive community. Certainly, these restorative measures could
take many forms, only one of which is legal regulation." 3 Yet, societies with
a history of respect for legality are likely to turn to solutions of this sort if
the threat to the community is persistent." 4
The case for this proposition is not so much empirical as interpretive.
Yet, viewing the responses of societies to ethnic and religious unrest as
communities striving for self-preservation does seem to shed light on the
complex web of arguments, counter-arguments, and resistance laid out in
the United States's controversy and on the pages of the country reports in
Striking A Balance. India, for example, has both a strong commitment to
democracy and a recent history of bitter ethnic and religious conflict. The
interpretive community hypothesis predicts that such a society would take
strong action to curb violence, discourage racist speech, and restore the
fragile interpretive community that is part of its democratic heritage and
ideals; indeed, it has done this." 5
A country like the former Soviet Union, by contrast, is marked by
balkanization and a tradition of centralized repressive government. Such a
society would not likely rely on shared expression, dialogue, and other
forms of communication to bind itself together. Rather, centralized authority serves that purpose. When intergroup conflict breaks out, the impulse to
restore a communicative paradigm will be weak. Consequently, laws against
109. Frank Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4,27 n.86

(1986).
110. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2335-41 (arguing that revilement is an instrument of
class subordination).
111. See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 453-56, 461 (arguing that hate speech is a means by
which cultural meanings are inscribed and played out).
112. See Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 177. On the resistance of ethnic imagery to
change, see Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1258 (1991).
113. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 310, 319-22.
114. See id. at 197 (using Latin America as an example of such a relatively peaceful ethnic
region). Of course, these societies may also value liberty, or free speech, or rugged
individualism, and the right of speakers to say whatever is on their minds. In such societies, the
response to an upsurge of social animosity is apt to be conflicted and complex. See infra notes
119-20 and accompanying text (discussing a matrix of factors).
115. Striking a Balance, supra note 6, at 171-81.
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hate speech will not be in force. If they are, they are apt to be used
eccentricially, as in the case of dissidents. 116
Finally, the United States has a history of severe and prolonged
friction embracing at least four ethnic minority groups and exceeding that
found in most other developed nations." 7 At the same time, the United
States has a strong commitment to the use of a common language, common
traditions, and common ideals and symbols as means of maintaining
national identity. The commitment to free and open expression is quite
strong. Moreover, the United States was founded, in part, as a reaction to
the oppression of crown and church. Freedom of expression was a core
Enlightenment value shared by many of the nation's Framers.118 In this
respect, the United States resembles nations such as Australia and South
Africa, which either do not enforce anti-hate laws or do so grudgingly. In
the United States, demographic changes and the increasing political force
of minorities, combined with diversity and multicultural movements on
campuses, indicate that this unsettled situation will likely continue into the
future until a new interpretive community and First Amendment paradigm
are finally agreed upon.
This insight leads to a conclusion that the editors and authors of
Striking A Balance may have overlooked. There may be no single balance
that will work for all cultures, or even for the same culture at different
times. The appropriate balance between equality and freedom of expression may be a complex, shifting matrix that includes several different
forces: the value placed on community historically and aspirationally; the
value placed on equality among the various national groups; the perception
that minority populations are unfairly excluded or stigmatized; the degree
to which speech is considered an important individual prerogative, rather
than a means of achieving community; and finally, the perception that
minority groups lack the means to assert and defend themselves against
vilification.
A slight change in the strength of any of these components in a given
setting may cause the balance and attitudes toward hate-speech regulation
to shift. For example, many university campuses have witnessed an increase
in the number of students of color and women seeking and gaining
admission coupled with increased competition for slots and financial
support. All the while, a sharp debate rages about the role of multiculturalism in admission, curriculum, and faculty employment. Racist speech and
insults occur frequently. Institutions where these divisive events occur are
likely to turn to speech regulation to preserve or restore peace and
community. Yet, these same measures will draw fire from proponents of
radical individualism" 9 and from those who benefit from the current
116. Id. at 130-35; see also id. at 238-39.
117. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 112, at 1261-75. For histories and discussions of
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119. Martin Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republic
Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 267, 302-03
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regime.' 20 The balance, then, is inherently unstable and likely to provoke
repeated challenges.
CONCLUSION

To return briefly to the interpretive community hypothesis, it seems
that liberty, including free speech, and community exist in a reciprocally
dependent tension. Each presupposes the other. As defenders of hatespeech regulation argue, dialogue is fruitless without something approaching equality among the speakers. 12' Defenders of protected speech point
out, with equal justification, that free speech is an important instrument for
achieving social justice-equality presupposes liberty. 22 Either value may
be used rhetorically, or in the real world, to suppress the other. The
demand for community may lead to conformity, censorship, and groupthink. Speech, if misused, can be used concertedly to oppress minority
groups.
Thus, neither value seems logically prior to the other; each is
necessary for the full expression of the other. Interpretive communities are
necessary for speech; speech is a necessary tool to restore, adjust, and refine
community. Striking A Balance lays out in its pages a dramatic portrait of
societies struggling to reach that balance in light of their own needs,
histories, and ethnic compositions. Perhaps the most valuable lesson to be
gleaned from this valuable collection of essays is that there are no simple
answers. Readers should distrust the facile urgings of both those who would
dismiss the community and equal protection values at stake in the controversy over campus anti-racism rules as well as those who give little weight to
the vitally important, historically-rooted values of free expression and free
speech.
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